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TEACIDNG THE LOGIC OFFALSIFICA TION:
A CLASSROOM EXERCISE
David Lopatto
Associate Professor of Psychology
Grinnell College
Grinnell, IA 50112
Every science teacher soon discovers that the intuitions students
use to solve problems are frequently at variance with the critical thinking
skills required by science. 1be exercise presented here focuses on the value
of making scientific hypotheses and then attempting to falsify rather than
confirm them.
When challenged to test a hypothesis, intuitive thinkers tend to
show a confirmation bias, i.e., they will propose a test in which the results
will be a positive instance of the hypothesis (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978;
Wason, 1960). Scientists, on the other hand, know that tests are specific
instances that cannot inductively ''prove" the hypothesis. Instead, scientists follow the lead of Karl Popper (1959), who formulated the logic of
falsification. Popper asserted that support for a hypothesis is always
provisional. Hypotheses cannot ever be conclusively proven. They can,
however, be disproved. A negative test in which the hypothesis is not
supported should cause the scientist to discard the hypothesis and try
another.
The difference between the confirmation bias and the logic of
falsification can be illustrated by the following classroom demonstration.
1be teacher begins by writing three names on the blackboard, let's say
Arthur, Alfred, Ann. Following the names is a blank line where the next
name will be written. 1be teacher gives the class the following task: Here

is a scientific problem/or you to solve. I am thinking of a rule that tells
me which names are right for this group and which are wrong for this
group. I am not going to tell you the rule right away. Rather, I want you
to form a hypothesis about what the rule might be. When you haveformed
your hypothesis, test that hypothesis by suggesting a name to go into the
blank space. Ifyour guess is consistent with the rule, I will say "Yes." If
your guess is not consistent with the rule, I will say "No." Chances are
that students will hypothesize that the rule is "Names beginning with A."
If they show the confirmation bias, they will suggest names such as Andrew
andAmy. Buttheruleisnot"Namesbeginningwith A" Theruleis"Names
8

Iowa Science Teachers Journal/Winier 1992-93

beginning with vowels." Because Andrew and Amy begin with vowels, the
reacher will say "Yes" after each one is suggested, and students may go on
to further think of names beginning with A. The teacher may allow this
hypothesis confirmation to go on for several names, and then ask a student
to state the rule. With some confidence the student will say "Names
beginning with A," to which the teacher replies, "No, that's not it." The
students may exhibit surprise.
At this point in the demonstration, the teacher should point out to
the students that the tests of the hypothesis they had formed were all tests
to confirm the hypothesis. The teacher should suggest that the students try
again, only this time attempt to generate tests that disconfirm their
hypothesis. Now students will generate names like David (no), Eliwbeth
(yes)and soon. By this method, they may eventually getto therule"Names
beginning with vowels."
The lesson can be repeated with numbers. The teacher begins by
writing the numbers 2, 4, 6 on the board, followed by a blank line. The
teacher repeats the instructions. Students are to form hypotheses about the
rule that governs the numbers and suggest a number that follows the trio on
the board Although they will be tempted to believe that the rule is "Count
by two's," students will be more wary than before. They may suggest 8 for
the next number, but students who have learned the lesson will not continue
to generate 10, 12, 14, etc. Instead, they will attempt to disconfirm their
hypothesis. By disconfirrning they may eventually discover the rule, which
is 'Toe number has to be larger than the preceding number."
It is useful to repeat the lesson in several ways so the students do
not dismiss the logic of falsification as a simple and unimportant trick.
Afterusing names and numbers, the interested teacher may be able to create
a third example using concepts within the content area of the science course.
One could attempt to test hypotheses about species of plants or elements in
the periodic table, for instance. A further refinement of the process may
occur ifit is possible for the students to have access to a laboratory. For
example, students could be given a sample of an unknown powder (see
Bluhm, 1991) and asked to generate tests for the hypothesis that the powder
is sugar. Students still operating under a confirmation bias might suggest
tasting the powder because the confirmatory point of view predicts the
powder will taste sweet. But if the powder is in reality not sugar, it could
be very unpalatable; students would learn the hard way to keep falsification
in mind.
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As a final step,itmaybe useful to have the students turn their newfound talent at the logic of falsification to the study of a current problem in

science. Students could consider questions regarding global warming or the
demise of the dinosaurs. Toe value of the exercise would not be in arriving
at a final answer, but in applying the logic of falsification to currently
popular hypotheses about phenomena.
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